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simplicity and therefore aids security in oil and gas conveyancing. A sale or reservation of a reversionary right seems objectionable to this policy because it disturbs title simplicity.
A top lease is analogous to a sale of a reversionary right.

However, its validity has never been questioned in the appellate
courts. A probable reason for this is the manner in which the
lease contract is used. Since mineral leases usually have short
terms, the mineral rights normally will not be kept from the land
for more than ten years. And since, by its nature, the top lease
would not be used as extensively as a sale of a reversionary right,
title simplicity would not seem to be disrupted. Therefore, even
though it would seem conceptually inconsistent to recognize a
top lease while refusing to allow a sale of a reversionary right,
such an inconsistency could be justified on practical grounds.
John B. Hussey, Jr.

Mineral Rights and After-Acquired Title
The only person capable of conveying title to property is the
owner.' However, when a vendor sells property which he does

2
not own and later acquires title, ownership vests in the vendee.
This doctrine, known as after-acquired title, does not appear in

the Civil Code, but has been developed in the jurisprudence as a
means of enforcing the vendor's warranty against eviction.3 The
1. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2452 (1870) : "The sale of a thing belonging to another
person is null; it may give rise to damages, when the buyer knew not that the
thing belonged to another person."
2. St. Landry Oil Co. v. Neal, 166 La. 799, 118 So. 24 (1928) ; Wolf v. Carter,
131 La. 667, 60 So. 52 (1912) ; Bonin v. Eyssaline, 12 Mart.(O.S.) 185 (1822).
See Comment, 23 TUL. L. REV. 533, 541 (1949). See also Comment, 15 TUL. L.
REV. 115, 121 (1940).
3. Wells v. Blackman, 121 La. 394, 46 So. 437 (1908) ; Bonin v. Eyssaline,
12 Mart.(O.S.) 185 (1822). The jurisprudence heretofore has been concerned only
with situations where warranty has been express or implied, but it would seem
that the doctrine should apply when there has been an exclusion of warranty, if
the purchaser had no knowledge of the danger of eviction. See Waterman v. Tidewater Assn., 213 La. 588, 35 So.2d 225 (1948) ; Rapp v. Lowry, 30 La. Ann. 1272
(1878). See also Comment, 23 TUL. L. REV. 533, 542 (1949), where it is stated:
"However, it appears that the doctrine should also be applied where the vendor
is liable only for restitution of the purchase price." The doctrine of after-acquired
title would also be applicable to a sale where warranty was express or implied
even if the purchaser had knowledge of the danger of eviction but did not purchase
at his risk and peril. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2500-2519, 2453 (1870).
It has been held that the doctrine of after-acquired title does not apply to a
sale by quitclaim deed. Waterman v. Tidewater Assn., 213 La. 588, 35 So.2d 225
(1948). Historically, the purpose of a quitclaim deed was to release any interest
the vendor had in the property and any acquisition of title by the vendee was only
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purpose of this Comment is to analyze the application of the doctrine of after-acquired title as applied to the mineral servitude
and the mineral lease.
After-Acquired Title and the Mineral Servitude
When mineral rights are sold or reserved, a mineral servitude
is created. 4 A mineral servitude may be extinguished by nonusage due to ten-year liberative prescription.5 There are several
situations in which the doctrine of after-acquired title could be
applied to mineral servitudes: when a person who purports to
have full ownership of land attempts to sell mineral rights, but
does not in fact own the land; when a person who purports to
have full ownership of land attempts to sell mineral rights does
not in fact own the minerals, although he owns the land; when
a person who simply purports to own mineral rights attempts
to convey them, but does not in fact own what he attempts to sell.
When a landowner has a defective title to the land, sells mineral rights, and subsequently acquires a valid title to the land
and mineral rights, the doctrine applies because when title to
the property is perfected, the title to the mineral rights is also
perfected.6 Logically it would follow that the title would also be
perfected in someone purchasing from the original mineral
vendee; additionally the doctrine would seem to apply if the orig7
inal mineral vendee acquired valid title by another means.
incidental. See 16 AM. JUR. § 18 (1938), and cases cited therein. If the parties
intend only a release of the vendor's claim to the property, the doctrine of afteracquired title would not be applicable. If, however, the parties intend for title to
pass it would seem that an approach consistent with principles of warranty would
be more appropriate in Louisiana. See Comment, 23 TUL. L. REV. 533 (1949).
The door is open for such an approach, for the denomination of a deed as a quitclaim is not conclusive. See Waterman v. Tidewater Assn., 8upra. See also Henningren v. Stromberg, 124 Mont. 185, 221 P.2d 438 (1950).
4. DAGoETT, MINERAL RIGHTS IN LOUISIANA 20 (rev. ed. 1949).
5. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 789 (1870).
6. See Lum Chow v. Board of Com'rs for Lafourche Basin Levee Dist., 203 La.
268, 13 So.2d 857 (1943), where property was acquired from the levee board in
1910 without the necessary certification by the state. In the Constitution of
1921 it was provided that the mineral rights on property sold by the state were
to be reserved. In 1935 a transferee of the original vendee acquired good title to
the property by state certification. In 1936 the plaintiff acquired the property
and the court held that the doctrine of after-acquired title perfected plaintiff'B
title to the land and the mineral rights.
However, when the landowner sells mineral rights which he does not own, he
is liable for a return of the purchase price. Treat v. Hunt Oil Co., 207 La. 539,
21 So.2d 721 (1945); Martin v. Wilkie, 24 So.2d 888 (La. App. 1946). See
Nabors, Report on Louisiana Mineral Law, 25 TuL. L. REV. 155, 163 (1951).
7. In St. Landry Oil & Gas Co. v. Neal, 166 La. 799, 118 So. 24 (1928), the
landowner created a mineral lease which was assigned to the plaintiff. It was
subsequently determined that the landowner did not own the land, but before the
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When a landowner sells mineral rights which he does not
own, there is some doubt as to when the doctrine of afteracquired title will apply." Although the Supreme Court has held
that the doctrine applies to such a situation," the court in several
cases also stated that the reversionary interest could be sold.10
The uncertainty in this area stems from a similarity between the
effects of the doctrine and the effect of the sale of a "reversionary right." Because of Louisiana's laws of prescription, outstanding mineral rights will return to the land ten years from
the date of the sale, absent user, acknowledgment, suspension or
extension." Since there is always a possibility that mineral
rights will return to the landowner, it has been stated that he
has a reversionary right. 2 Although early cases tended toward
a recognition of this right as an object which the landowner
assignee brought suit against the assignor the latter secured a ratification of the
lease and the court held that the plaintiff's lease was perfected by the doctrine of
after-acquired title. It would seem that the same principle would control when
mineral rights (a mineral servitude) were involved.
It is significant to note that the owner of a mineral servitude who transfers
his mineral rights warrants the existence of the servitude, but does not warrant
that part of liberative prescription has not run on the mineral rights. Dens v.
Lane, 202 La. 933, 13 So.2d 270 (1943). See Nabors, Report on Louisiana Mineral Law, 25 TUL. L. REV. 155 (1951). See also The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1951-1952 Term- Mineral Rights, 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 168, 175 (1953) ; Comment, 30 TuL. L. REV. 462, 464 (1956) ; THIRD INSTITUTE ON MINERAL LAW 78 (1955).
8. Hicks v. Clark, 225 La. 133, 72 So.2d 322 (1954) ; Long Bell Lumber Co. v.
Granger, 222 La. 670, 63 So.2d 420 (1953). See also The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1951-1952 Term - Mineral Rights, 14 LOUISIANA LAW
REVIEW 168, 175 (1953) ; The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 19521958 Term - Mineral Rights, 15 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 231 (1954) ; Comment,
30 TUL. L. REV. 462, 464 (1956).; THIRD INSTITUTE ON MINERAL LAW 78 (1955).
9. In Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Thompson, 222 La. 868, 64 So.2d 202
(1952), the landowner, believing that the outstanding mineral rights had prescribed, sold the mineral rights again. However, prescription had been suspended
and the second sale was a nullity. When the outstanding mineral rights prescribed, the court held that the doctrine of after-acquired title perfected the second
sale of the mineral rights.
In Bates v. Monzingo, 221 La. 479, 59 So.2d 693 (1952), the landowner acquired property in 1927 and his vendors reserved one-half the mineral rights. In
1935, before the outstanding mineral rights prescribed, the landowner sold onehalf the mineral rights to one party and one-eighth of his mineral rights (which
he did not own at the time) to one Fuller. In 1942, after the minerals reserved
by the vendor of the landowner prescribed, the landowner sold the property. The
court held that since the landowner reacquired the mineral rights before he sold
the land, Fuller's title to one-eighth the mineral rights was perfected.
The case of McDonald v. Richard, 203 La. 155, 13 So.2d 712 (1943), presented
a similar situation except that the landowner sold the land before the outstanding
mineral rights prescribed. Therefore, the doctrine of after-acquired title did not
perfect the mineral vendee's title.
10. See McDonald v, Richard, 203 La. 155, 13 So.2d 712 (1943). See also
White v. Hodges, 201 La. 1, 9 So.2d 433 (1942) ; Hodges v. Norton, 200 La. 614,
8 So.2d 618 (1942).
11. DAOETT, MINERAL RIGHTS IN LOUISIANA 53 (rev. ed. 1949).
12. Id. at 134.
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could sell or reserve,18 the recent case of Hicks v. Clark 4 held
that such a right was not an article of commerce and could not
be reserved. The reason given was that by reserving this right
the landowner could burden the land with mineral interests for
more than ten years without user or any of the other methods
of extending the life of outstanding mineral rights. In the Hicks
case, the court held that a reservation of the reversionary right
would be nonetheless violative of public policy if, as a mineral
servitude, it were limited in existence to ten years from the date
of the sale. 15 The rationale was that even though the right reserved might not exist for more than ten years, there would be
an encumbrance on the property for more than this period. However, it would seem that, since mineral rights can be kept outstanding for a period in excess of ten years by acknowledgment
and various other methods, a more fundamental reason for re16
jection of the reversionary right might exist.

In the Hicks case the landowner sold mineral rights to X and
in a subsequent sale of the land to Y purported to reserve the
same mineral rights to himself. It is clear that if the court had
upheld the landowner's reservation of the reversionary right,
the minerals, rather than reverting to the land as required by
classic civilian principles, would have reverted to an individual
- i.e., the former landowner. A similar situation may be observed when the landowner sells minerals to X, then purports
to sell the same minerals to Y, and thereafter conveys title to the
land to Z before the first mineral servitude prescribes. If Y's
right to the reversion were upheld, the mineral rights would
again be reverting, not to the land, but to an individual other
than the landowner. It is felt that this is the real basis for the
rejection of the reversionary right as an article of commerce. It
is not merely the fact that mineral rights would be outstanding
for more than ten years, for such a result may be accomplished
by other means; rather, it is the fact that to uphold the landowner's reservation in the first situation and the sale of min13. Layne v. Superior Oil Co., 209 La. 1014, 26 So.2d 20 (1946) ; Gulf Refining
Co. v. Orr, 207 La. 915, 22 So.2d 269 (1945) ; Hodges v. Norton, 200 La. 614,

8 So.2d 618 (1942) ; Gailey v. McFarlain, 194 La. 150, 193 So. 570 (1940).

See

also DAGGETT, MINERAL RIGHTS IN LOUISIANA 134 (rev. ed. 1949).
14. 225 La. 133, 72 So.2d 322 (1954), 15 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 231.
15. Ibid. The court reasoned that the right to create a servitude upon an estate

belonged exclusively to the owner; and if the landowner were to be capable of
reserving the reversionary interest to the minerals when he sells the land, the
mineral rights could be outstanding for more than ten years without exercise of
the right to explore.
16. See Comment, 18 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw 300 (1958).
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erals to Y in the second would require the creation of a right unknown to Louisiana law.
A similarity of after-acquired title to the reversionary interest may be observed in the fact that if after-acquired title is applicable, mineral rights are outstanding for more than ten years
without user, acknowledgment, suspension, or extension. However, if the doctrine of after-acquired title were merely a method
of effecting a sale of a reversionary interest by another label, it
would 'be held inapplicable. It is felt that an analysis of the limited situations in which the doctrine of after-acquired title may
be applied will demonstrate a fundamental difference between
the two concepts.
As opposed to situations involving sale of a reversionary
right, there is no attempt to deal with a separate mineral estate
when a landowner purports to sell mineral rights which he does
not own.' 7 The doctrine of after-acquired title merely operates
to validate a defective prior sale upon vesting of title in the
vendor. Thus, the doctrine would be inapplicable when a landowner, after selling his mineral rights to X, attempts to reserve
the same interest in a sale of his land to Y; or, when the landowner having sold minerals to X, purports to sell the same mineral rights to Y and then sells the land to Z.
In neither of the above instances is there a vesting of title in
a mineral vendor which perfects a prior sale of mineral rights
not owned.' 8 Since application of the doctrine must be limited to
those situations in which the vendor of minpral rights not owned
remains owner of the land until title to the mineral rights return,
or the vendor otherwise acquires title to the mineral rights, any
subsequent purchaser of the land would acquire the property
subject to only one mineral servitude. 19
Another limitation would be that the prescription on the second sale of minerals would have to run from the date of the sale
20
rather than from the date that the prior servitude lapsed.
Otherwise a landowner could create a second estate in minerals,
to begin running as of the time the first servitude expired. If
this situation were allowed, a landowner could set up several
estates in the same person and thereby defeat the laws of pre17. DAGGETT, MINERAL RIGHTS IN LOUISIANA 14041 (rev. ed. 1949).
18. See McDonald v. Richard, 203 La. 155, 13 So.2d 712 (1943).
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
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scription. It would therefore seem imperative to require that
prescription run against the purported sale of unowned mineral
21
rights from the date of the sale.
In the case of Long Bell Lumber Co. v. Granger22 it was held
that the doctrine of after-acquired title would not perfect a second sale of mineral rights to the vendee of the first servitude
while that servitude was still in existence. The theory was that
a person could not validly purchase that which he already
owned. However, it seems that this situation is different from
the sale of an object such as land. Where a person attempts to
purchase land which he already owns there is no after-acquired
title in the vendor. However, in the Long Bell case there was an
after-acquired title in the mineral vendor because the outstanding mineral rights prescribed and the mineral vendor reacquired
the mineral rights within ten years from the date of the sale.
Furthermore, it is difficult to distinguish the effect of the Long
Bell situation from that of an acknowledgment. If a landowner
may acknowledge a mineral servitude with intent to interrupt
prescription and thereby allow mineral rights to be outstanding
for more than ten years, it seems illogical to say that, when he
sells again the same mineral rights to the same vendee, and remains the landowner until the outstanding mineral servitude expires, the doctrine of after-acquired title would not apply. 28
21. In the case of White v. Hodges, 201 La. 1, 9 So.2d 433 (1942), decided
at a time when it was not certain that the reversionary right could not be reserved or sold, the landowner sold mineral rights when mineral rights were outstanding. There was production and the outstanding mineral rights did not prescribe until the lapse of more than ten years from the date of the "second sale."
The court held that the outstanding mineral rights were an obstacle preventing
prescription from running against the subsequently created mineral rights. Therefore, the court held that upon the expiration of the first mineral servitude, the
title of the second mineral vendee was perfected and prescription would commence to run from the date of perfection of the mineral servitude.
However, in McDonald v. Richard, 203 La. 155, 13 So.2d 712 (1943), the
court held that Article 792 of the Code did not authorize a landowner to impose
an interminable series of mineral servitudes upon his land. It was further held
that a mineral servitude previously imposed was not an obstacle to the exercise
of a mineral servitude subsequently imposed. Article 792 was held to have reference only to those obstacles which the servitude owner could neither prevent nor
remove. The court inferred that if the mineral vendee purchased mineral rights
when he knew that the mineral rights were outstanding, he would be held to have
impliedly consented to the servitude. It would seem that even if the mineral vendee
was not aware of the outstanding servitude, purchased mineral rights, and did not
sue for a return of the purchase price upon learning of the outstanding servitude,
he would also be held to have impliedly consented to the prior mineral servitude.
22. 222 La. 670, 63 So.2d 420 (1953).
23. See Nabors, Report on Louisiana Mineral Law, 25 TuL. L. REV. 303, 31011 (1951) (discussion of Long Bell Petroleum Co. v. Tritico, 216 La. 426, 43
So.2d 782 (1949)). See also The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1951-1952 Term - Mineral Rights, 14 LouiSIANA LAW REvIEw 168, 175 (1953).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XVIII

The Mineral Lease and After-Acquired Title
Since the lessor-assignor of a mineral lease warrants the
lessee against eviction from the thing leased, 24 it has been held
that the doctrine of after-acquired title generally applies. 25 The
cases have applied the doctrine to three different situations:
(a) when the landowner who executed a mineral lease held a
defective title to the land, the lessee assigned the lease, but secured a ratification from the true owner of the land ;26 (b) when
the "landowner" who executed the lease did not own the land,
but subsequently acquired valid title to the land ;27 and (c) when
the landowner who executed the lease did not own the mineral
rights which he purported to lease, but subsequently acquired
title to the mineral rights.28
Since its decision in Hicks v. Clark29 rejecting the reversionary right as an object of commerce, the Louisiana Supreme Court
has not been presented with a situation in which the landowner
purports to create a lease upon mineral rights not owned. Although after-acquired title may affect a lease of mineral rights
not owned at the time of the lease, the lease would not affect the
outstanding mineral rights until they prescribed. Furthermore,
the outstanding mineral rights should have to prescribe within
24. The warranty provisions of the Code dealing both with lease and sale have
been held applicable to mineral leases. See Martel v. Hunt, 195 La. 701, 197 So.
402 (1940) ; Cooke v. Gulf Refining Co., 135 La. 609, 612, 65 So.2d 758, 761
(1914) ; Rives v. Gulf Refining Co., 133 La. 178, 182, 62 So. 623, 627 (1913).
Although the assignee of a mineral lease acquires an incorporeal real right, the
Code articles on warranty against eviction are applicable. Tomlinson v. Thurman,
189 La. 959, 181 So. 458 (1938). See also Lockwood Oil Co. v. Atkins, 158 La.
610, 613, 104 So. 386, 388 (1925).
25. St. Landry Oil & Gas Co. v. Neal, 166 La. 799, 118 So. 24 (1928). See
Jackson v. United Gas Public Service Co., 196 La. 1, 198 So. 633 (1940) ; Gayoso
Co. v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 176 La. 333, 145 So. 677 (1933).
26. St. Landry Oil & Gas Co. v. Neal, 166 La. 799, 802, 118 So. 24, 25 (1928).
The court stated: "Ordinarily, where one sells the property of another and - the
later
rule is equally applicable to the granting or sale of mineral leases -and
acquires title to the property sold by him, the title vests immediately in his
vendee."
27. Jackson v. United Gas Public Service Co., 196 La. 1, 198 So. 633 (1940).
In this case certain heirs sold an undivided interest in land which they did not
own at the time. The purchaser of the land sold some mineral rights and created
mineral leases. The court held that when the heirs acquired valid title to the
property this inured to the benefit of the purchaser of the land and persons holding
rights under the purchaser. Referring to after-acquired title the court stated:
"This doctrine is so well established that we deem it unnecessary to discuss it
further." Id. at 14, 198 So. at 637.
28. Gayoso Co. v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 176 La. 333, 145 So. 677
(1933). In this case the landowner executed a mineral lease when the mineral
rights were outstanding. Some one and one-half years later the outstanding mineral rights returned to the land and the court held that the lease was perfected
by the doctrine of after-acquired title.
29. 225 La. 133, 72 So.2d 322 (1954).
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the term of the lease, and the lessor would have to be the party
who acquired the outstanding mineral rights. If a landowner,
who purported to lease mineral rights which he did not-own, sold
the land before the outstanding mineral rights prescribed, the
doctrine of after-acquired title would not perfect the lease because there would be no after-acquired title in the lessor.
In the case of Bazemore v. Whittington0 the federal court of
appeals was presented with a situation in which a landowner
purported to lease mineral rights, some of which were outstanding. The facts of the case, although involved, are essentially as
follows: Bazemore owned certain land and only one-half the mineral rights. Robertson Stores obtained a lease with warranty
from Bazemore which purported to cover all the mineral rights.
However, a stipulation in the lease provided that, if the landowner did not own the entire mineral rights, the bonus and rentals would be reduced in proportion to the mineral rights the
landowner was capable of leasing. 81
Prior to the execution of the "Bazemore lease," Robertson
Stores had secured a lease of the outstanding mineral rights
from the mineral servitude owner. About four years before the
outstanding mineral rights were to prescribe, Robertson Stores
assigned all of its right, title, and interest in the "Bazemore
lease" to one of the plaintiffs.82 When the outstanding mineral
rights prescribed, Bazemore executed a lease purporting to cover
the newly-acquired mineral rights and the plaintiffs brought suit
alleging that their lease, which purportedly covered all the mineral rights, was perfected when Bazemore acquired the outstanding mineral rights. The federal district court held that the plaintiffs' title was perfected under the after-acquired title doctrine.8 3
On appeal, the federal court of appeals reversed the lower court
and held that the doctrine of after-acquired title did not apply.
30. 245 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1957).
31. The lease contract read: "Lessor hereby warrants and agrees to defend
the title to said land . . . . Without impairment of lessee's rights under the warranty in event of failure of title, it is agreed that if the lessor owns an interest in
said land less than the entire fee simple estate, then the royalties and rentals to
be paid lessor shall be reduced proportionately." Id. at 945, n. 5.
32. The assignment was of "all of its right, title and interest in and to certain
leases" which included the Bazemore lease. However, specific reference to the
Bazemore lease provided that at the time of the assignment it was only valid as
to one-half the mineral rights. The district court held that this was merely a
stipulation as to the validity of the lease as of the time of the assignment, but
Judge Brown, the organ of the court of appeals, felt that the assignment was meaningless insofar as it purported to cover more mineral rights than the lessor had to
lease.
33. See Discussion Notes, 4 Oil & Gas Reporter 1528-29 (1955).
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The primary basis for reversing the lower court was that the
assignment by the lessee (Robertson Stores) without express
warranty and in terms of all its right, title, and interest constituted a quitclaim deed. It is suggested that the court erred on
this point, for the Code expressly provides that warranty is implied in the absence of an express provision of warranty.3 4 Also,
5
the Louisiana Supreme
in the case of Tomlinson v. Thurman"
Court held that an assignment of mineral rights, without express warranty and in terms of all right, title, and interest, constituted an assignment with warranty.
Judge Brown, the organ of the court in the Bazemore case,
speaking without the concurrence of the other two judges, stated
that, even if the assignment of the lease had not been by quitclaim deed, the doctrine of after-acquired title would not apply.
He reasoned that, since the assignor (Robertson Stores) held
leases from both Bazemore and the mineral servitude owner, and
rent under the Bazemore lease was to be in proportion to the interest Bazemore was capable of leasing, the assignor could
neither have rescinded the lease nor recovered the price paid for
the lease nor even have recovered damages. Therefore, since
after-acquired title would not perfect the assignor's title, it did
not perfect the plaintiffs'.
It is suggested that the doctrine of after-acquired
title might
have been logically applied in spite of the reason given above.
When the parties to the "Bazemore lease" provided for a proportionate reduction in royalty and rentals, they were only stipulating what the law would have ultimately required. 3 When a
lessor leases more property than he owns, the lessor becomes
liable for a proportionate reduction in the rent.8 7 In such a case,
whether or not reduction is provided for in the lease contract, the
lessor has nonetheless warranted the entire subject matter of the
34. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2501 (1870) provides: "Although at the time of the
sale no stipulations have been made respecting the warranty, the seller is obliged, of
course, to warrant the buyer against the eviction suffered by him from the totality
or part of the thing sold, and against the charges claimed on such thing, which
were not declared at the time of the sale."
35. 189 La. 959, 181 So. 458 (1938).
36. Article 2701 of the Civil Code provides that when a lessor leases more
property than he owns, the lessee can claim an abatement of rent according to the
provisions of the Code which treat of sales. Article 2492, found in Title VII,
which treats "Of Sale," provides that when an immovable is sold with an indication of the extent of the premises at the rate of so much per measure, the vendor
is required to deliver to the buyer the quantity mentioned or suffer a proportionate
diminution in price. When a sale is involved once the price is reduced, the vendor
is no longer under any liability to the vendee. However, when there are periodic
payments under a lease, it would seem that a different situation is presented.
37. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2701, 2492 (1870).
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lease. If, during the term of the lease, he acquired title to the
property, this title should inure to the benefit of his lessee. When
there is no stipulation for proportionate reduction in the rent,
after-acquired title should relieve the lessor of liability for reduction when subsequent rent payments become due. When the
parties have so stipulated, as they did in the Bazemore case, the
operation of the doctrine of after-acquired title should fulfill the
lessor's obligation to deliver the entire subject matter of the
lease and require the lessee to pay rentals accordingly.
Judge Brown stated that "the intent of Bazemore's unconditional lease was to 'sell' to Robertson Stores, Inc., Bazemore's
's It was further stated that this was
reversion."3
forbidden as an
obvious means of defeating Louisiana's codal policy of liberative
prescription. It seems that a distinction should be drawn between the sale of a reversionary right and the perfection of a
lease through acquisition by the lessor of title to all or part of
the mineral rights which he purported to lease, and within the
terms of the lease.3 9 Although the right to explore is the same
whether granted by lease or by sale of mineral rights, the legal
natures of a lease and a mineral servitude are very different. 4
A landowner or mineral servitude holder creates a lease for the
primary purpose of securing production, whereas the primary
purpose for selling mineral rights is generally the initial consideration. Further, the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that
41
the lease provisions of the Code apply to mineral leases.
Therefore, it seems that Judge Brown in Bazemore v. Whittington erred in stating that a lease of mineral rights not owned was
an attempted sale of the landowner's reversionary interest.
The writer feels that a "Bazemore type lease" is not a lease
38. 245 F.2d 943, 949 (5th Cir. 1957).
39. In Hicks v. Clark, 225 La. 133, 72 So.2d 322 (1954), the reversionary
right was held to be the hope that the mineral rights would return to the land.
If this object were allowed to become an object of commerce, the fulfillment of
the hope would be a valid mineral servitude. Since the reversionary right has been
held not to be an object of commerce, there could not be a lease of the reversionary
right as such. However, it would seem that a landowner could execute a lease
which provided that any mineral rights which the lessor acquired within the terms
of the lease would be subject to the lease. This type of lease was upheld in the
case of Dees v. Hunt Oil Co., 123 F. Supp. 58 (W.D. La. 1954). See Discussion
Notes, 3 Oil and Gas Reporter 1865-66 (1954).
'40. DAGGETT, MINERAL RIGHTS IN LOUISIANA 12-17 (rev. ed. 1949).
41. Coyle v. North American Oil Consolidated, 201 La. 99, 9 So.2d 473 (1942)
Tyson v. Surf Oil Co., 195 La. 248, 196 So. 336 (1940). See also DAGOETT, MINERAT RIGHTS IN LOUISIANA 17 (rev. ed. 1949) : "As a matter of ordinary civil
contract, however it is the opinion of the writer that the life term of an unproductive lease . . . should be, and that it is the intention of the Court that it will
be, confined to the same term of ten years."
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of reversionary rights in the sense that the lease would be extended beyond its primary term in the absence of production; or,
that the lease would be valid if the mineral rights returned to
the land within the primary term of the lease when the lessor
had previously sold the land. 42 For these reasons, it is suggested

that, when the doctrine of after-acquired title perfects a lease of
mineral rights not owned at the time of execution but subsequently acquired, there is no violation of the policy
considera43
tions adhered to by the Louisiana Supreme Court.
Burrell J. Carter

Negotiable Instruments Law-

"Close Connexity" and

the Finance Company as a Holder in Due Course
Basic to the concept of negotiability is the immunity of the
holder in due course' from defenses founded on defects not apparent on the face of the instrument and of which he has no
knowledge.2 In such a case, the holder in due course is not subject to all the defenses and equities available between the original
parties to the instrument. It is this right of the holder in due
course to rely on the face of the instrument that gives it much of
its commercial usefulness. Maximum negotiability would be
achieved by protecting the holder in due course from all defects
not apparent on the face of the instrument. However, the exigencies of commercial intercourse neither require nor permit
such complete negotiability.
Although problems concerning the status of a party as a
holder in due course are by no means new, with the advent of
post-war prosperity and the marked increase in installment purchasing of consumer goods, the courts have been faced with an
increasing number of situations involving finance companies
which deal in installment paper.
Ordinarily, notes on which finance companies seek to recover
42. See note 39 supra.
43. See Hicks v. Clark, 225 La. 133, 72 So.2d 322 (1954) ; Long Bell Lumber
Co. v. Granger, 222 La. 670, 63 So.2d 420 (1953) ; Liberty Farms v. Miller, 216
La. 1023, 45 So.2d 610 (1950) ;Long Bell Petroleum Co. v. Tritico, 216 La. 426,
43 So.2d 782 (1949). See also Discussion Notes, 4 Oil and Gas Reporter 152829 (1955).
1. See, generally, BRITTON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES 853
et seq. (1943).
2. Id. at 407, § 100 et seq.

